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Enclaves, borders, and everyday movements: 
Palestinian marginal mobility in East Jerusalem 
 
Abstract 
 
Jerusalem might be considered an enclave city par excellence: Israeli settlements in the Palestinian 
east of the city enjoy higher levels of services and are connected through infrastructures that 
immobilise those in Palestinian neighbourhoods. At the same time, Palestinian neighbourhoods 
have become exclaves of the city since the construction of the Separation Barrier. Beyond the top-
down view of ethnically-based residential segregation, however, attention to quotidian movements 
reveals the practices through which the borders of enclaves are undermined and reinforced. 
Palestinians move through and into exclusively Jewish spaces, strategically making use of their 
amenities, while utilising the spatial autonomy of marginalised Palestinian areas. As borders are 
reinforced from above and below in times of political tension, they also attempt to disrupt Israeli 
intrusions into their enclaves. By showing how the quotidian practices of marginalised residents 
continually undermine and re-make intra-urban borders, the mobility-based perspective adds 
valuable nuances to the understanding of Jerusalem as an enclave city. 
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Introduction 
 
In Jerusalem, where most neighbourhoods are divided along ethno-national lines, Palestinian 
neighbourhoods are underserved by the municipality, while Israeli settlements in their midst enjoy a 
much higher level of amenities. Segregated infrastructures fragment urban space and entrench 
socio-spatial divisions. From this perspective, the city appears to fit neatly into prevalent 
understandings of processes of exclusion in enclave cities, according to which dominant groups 
construct gated enclaves to shield themselves from the marginalised. This paper argues, however, 
that if urban segregation is examined through the lens of people’s movements rather than merely 
static residential patterns, new perspectives open up which permit the agency of marginalised 
residents to become visible and allow us to understand how enclaves are both undermined and 
reinforced through quotidian practices. 
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In this article I seek to answer the following questions in the context of Palestinian everyday 
mobility in Jerusalem: How does movement across segregated urban space affect the borders of 
enclaves, in the short and long term? When and how are enclave borders reinforced? And how does 
paying attention to mobility alter the picture presented by an analysis solely based on residential 
segregation? Jerusalem presents an excellent case study for examining these issues, as it constitutes 
an extreme example of urban segregation due to its clearly defined residential enclaves reinforced 
by a history of ethnic division and ongoing institutionalised exclusion. The Jerusalem light rail 
(JLR), which began operating in 2011, serves as a particularly salient case study as it is the first 
mode of public transportation to connect Israeli settlements and Palestinian neighbourhoods, thus 
de-segregating public transport in some areas. I focus here on the enclaves of Israeli-occupied East 
Jerusalem and its immediate hinterland, forgoing a discussion of enclaves within the west of the city 
(cf. Hasson, 2001). 
A short description of the methods and theoretical approach used is followed by a review of the 
literature and an outline of the local manifestations of ‘enclave urbanism’. The argument of the 
empirical section consists of two main parts. In the first, I show how Palestinians cross Israeli-
imposed boundaries to maintain severed urban linkages, how embodied practices can contribute to a 
sense of freedom of movement despite these restrictions, and how Palestinians move through (and 
into) Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem to gain access to resources denied to Palestinian 
neighbourhoods. In the second section, I argue that Palestinians make use of the relative autonomy 
afforded by exclusionary exclaves created by the Separation Barrier.
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 I examine Palestinian 
reactions to what is perceived as Israeli infringement on Palestinian space by way of the light rail, 
reading their restriction of Israeli mobility as part of a broader struggle over the control of space. 
Finally, I show how borders are reinforced by both voluntary and enforced limitation of movement 
across enclaves in times of heightened tension. I conclude that enclaves are not static, but are 
consistently undermined and re-made through quotidian practices. The mobility-based perspective 
thus adds valuable nuances to the understanding of Jerusalem as an enclave city, and may help us 
rethink internal divisions in less conflict-prone cities as well.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 As the Barrier takes the form of a concrete wall of up to nine meters in height in the urban areas discussed, I use the terms ‘Wall’ and ‘Barrier’ 
interchangeably here. 
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Methodological and theoretical approach 
 
This article relies primarily on data collected in 146 semi-structured interviews and follow-up 
conversations, the majority of which were conducted between July and September 2013, and 
between June and September 2014 and 2015 -- periods during which the prevailing levels of tension 
in Jerusalem fluctuated strongly. Of the Palestinian respondents, residents of and commuters to East 
Jerusalem were the primary target group (31% of the total, 56% of them female); in interviewing 
them, I frequently employed a ‘go-along’ approach (Kusenbach, 2003). Other respondents included 
transport company managers and employees, including drivers (15%), NGO representatives and 
researchers (13%), community leaders and local officials (5%) as well as national government 
officials and planners (3%). Israeli respondents included NGO representatives and researchers 
(12%), municipal officials and planners (8%), officials and consultants of the Jerusalem 
Transportation Master Plan (JTMT) and light rail project (8%) as well as residents of West 
Jerusalem (3%). I carried out extensive on-site visits, participant observation on various forms of 
public transport and visual research in the form of photographing, filming and mapping sites and 
movements. Due to the sensitive nature of Palestinians’ status in East Jerusalem, I use pseudonyms 
for these respondents.  
 
While the role of infrastructures in enforcing the division of Jerusalem has been explored taking the 
top-down view of planning, the politics of Palestinian mobility within East Jerusalem have not been 
sufficiently examined from a bottom-up perspective. This approach may permit us to nuance the 
picture of urban enclave life. Accordingly, the ‘people-based’ approach (Kwan, 2009) taken here, 
insists on the political importance of the everyday in shaping urban space through routine activities, 
including tactics that subtly resist power by seizing opportunities (de Certeau, 1984). Rather than 
only through policy, cities are also shaped by the activities of their residents, even the most 
marginalised. Such reshaping, achieved through incremental changes to the usage of spaces, has 
been called the ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ (Bayat, 2009). The need for attention to 
mobility across borders is grounded in the understanding that space is not static or frozen in time, 
but is made up of a multiplicity of trajectories (Massey, 2005), which are in themselves worth 
exploring. As much as by static enclaves, the lives and identities of city dwellers are shaped by 
circulations which enable encounters between different groups (Jensen, 2009). Following from 
Simmel’s notion that a border ‘is not a spatial fact with sociological consequences, but a 
sociological fact that forms itself spatially’ (1997: 143), I conceptualise intra-urban borders not as a 
given, but as products of ongoing processes of reinforcement and subversion through everyday 
4 
actions which co-constitute the physical reality of the border. In a contested space such as 
Jerusalem, both top-down interventions and everyday acts are often based on the attempt to create 
or maintain ethnically homogenous enclaves, what Sibley (1995) terms the ‘purification of space’. 
As conflict in Jerusalem (as well as its potential resolution) is often conceived of from a bird’s-eye 
view (Geneva Accord, 2009: 111), understanding socio-spatial dynamics through everyday 
interactions at street level is important for gaining an understanding of the lived city.  
 
Urban enclaves and the mobility gap underpinning them 
 
While ethnically-based segregation is by no means a new phenomenon in cities (Nightingale, 2012), 
the urban studies literature in recent decades has paid particular attention to class-based segregation 
in line with the worldwide neoliberal turn (Castells, 1996; Davis, 2007). As privatised service 
provision has replaced the integrated ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ of public urban amenities, 
homogenous and securitised quarters emerged at the expense of shared public spaces (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001). Enclaves are often subject to special governance regimes and access restrictions – 
their etymological root in the Latin word clavis (‘key’) points to the fact that their closed-off 
perimeter is a defining aspect. Thus, the emergence of affluent gated communities alongside 
marginal areas is understood to have created new forms of inclusion and exclusion in the 
postindustrial city (Douglass et al., 2012). Enclave urbanism is not merely an expression of 
inequality, but also reproduces it – for instance, when securitised gated communities cause a 
decrease in security for those living outside the enclaves (Kaker, 2014). The overarching narrative 
of this new form of ‘enclave urbanism’ is thus often ‘alarmist’ in that it links enclaves to the decline 
of both the public realm and the socially diverse yet coherent city (Wissink, 2013). 
Despite the recent ‘mobilities turn’ (Urry, 2007; Sheller, 2004), the literature on urban segregation 
and enclaves has not paid sufficient attention to activities and mobilities, focusing its analysis 
mainly on residential patterns (Kwan, 2009, 2013). The role of mobility is mainly understood in the 
context of unequal access to infrastructures, which creates ‘premium networked spaces’ at the 
expense of those living in ‘spaces of immobility and fear’ outside the elite enclaves (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001). This analysis is in line with the wider mobilities literature, which has highlighted 
the importance of immobilisations (Adey, 2006): while the movement of ‘kinetic elites’ is 
facilitated (Cresswell, 2010), the mobility of less desirable subjects is curtailed (Shamir, 2005), 
resulting in a ‘mobility gap’ (Turner, 2007). Research on mobilities has examined the subversive 
and transgressive potential of embodied leisure practices in the city, such as walking (Pinder, 2011), 
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cycling (Spinney, 2010), and parkour (Saville, 2008; Mould, 2009), but has primarily done so in 
localities where conflicts over urban spaces do not have repercussions as severe as in a contested 
city such as Jerusalem. 
According to Caldeira (1996), the spatial segregation produced by fortified urban enclaves limits 
everyday interactions with other groups and thereby magnifies perceptions of social difference; the 
interactions that do take place as borders are crossed are marked by ‘suspicion and danger’. The 
picture painted, then, is one of spatial isolation and inequality, both in terms of residential service 
provision – what has been termed ‘infrastructural violence’ (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012) – and in 
the means of mobility. Physical proximity in the city is no longer seen as a key determinant of 
social interaction (Coutard, 2008) and since cross-enclave or chance encounters are limited, 
inequalities are exacerbated and the potential (physical and political) space for forging solidarities is 
undermined (Young, 2000; Sennett, 2007). An examination of the literature on enclaves and 
mobility in the Jerusalem context would, at first glance, seem to support these notions, even to an 
extreme degree. 
 
Enclave urbanism in East Jerusalem from the top down 
 
In Jerusalem, which is routinely referred to as ‘divided’ (Klein, 2005), ‘segregated’ (Thawaba and 
Al-Rimmawi, 2013), ‘fragmented’ (Pullan, 2011), or even ‘many bordered’ (Dumper, 2014), 
enclaves have a long history. While communal borders in Jerusalem were defined by Mahallat 
neighbourhood units during Ottoman times (Tamari, 2009), the clear segmentation of the old city 
into four confessional quarters was only implemented during the British Mandate, when Jerusalem 
was rebuilt as a 'divided city' on the basis of the principle of the ‘unmixing of peoples’ (Roberts, 
2013). However, despite the Mandate authorities’ insistence on ethnic segregation, there were 
significant zones of mixing, in particular in commercial areas (Abowd, 2014). Between 1948 and 
1967, the West of the city became part of the newly established state of Israel, while East Jerusalem 
was under Jordanian control. The armistice line of 1949 running through Jerusalem, referred to as 
the ‘Green Line’, remains internationally recognised despite the fact that Israel has occupied East 
Jerusalem since 1967 (Lustick, 1997), effectively annexing it (Basic Law, 1980), without, however, 
granting citizenship rights to the city’s Palestinian residents, who have the status of ‘permanent 
residents’.  
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While Palestinians continue to conceive of the city as the capital of their future state, Israeli urban 
planning policy reflects the goal of avoiding any future partition of the city (Bollens, 1998). Since 
1967, numerous Israeli settlements have been constructed. They house approximately 200,000 
Jewish Israelis (UN OCHA, 2014) and range in size from large-scale neighbourhoods to individual 
securitised houses in the midst of the Palestinian communities (Dumper, 1997). Both forms are not 
merely isolated enclaves, but also perform a frontier-expanding function. The major settlements in 
East Jerusalem today are closely linked to the west of the city, annexing large swathes of 
Palestinian land and conceptually shifting the Green Line far into East Jerusalem and even past the 
municipal boundary (Shlay and Rosen, 2010; Allegra, 2013). Due to this strategic purpose, such 
localities have been described as part of a ‘civilian occupation’ (Segal and Weizman, 2003). Owing 
to their military origins, the settlement enclaves are built as ‘defensible spaces’ (Newman, 1972) in 
that they are clearly demarcated, internally cohesive, and ensure easy surveillance of anyone 
entering (Savitch, 2005). Their homogeneity and exclusivity is ensured by ethnically-based 
landownership laws and property markets (Yacobi, 2012a). Access to the larger settlement 
neighbourhoods in Jerusalem is not restricted by a highly security perimeter, but through ‘carefully 
selected’ connections and disconnections of the mobility infrastructures (Pullan, 2013a). It is often 
impossible to walk from a Palestinian area to a neighbouring settlement without being forced by the 
lack of pedestrian pavements to walk on the road or across open space, or even to cross major 
highways. Because cross-enclave movement is thus restricted but not impossible, we can think of 
the perimeters of these enclaves as ‘borders’ in the sense of Sennett (2011): they are semi-
permeable membranes rather than boundaries or hard edges that undermine activity on either side.  
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Figure 1: Enclave urbanism in East Jerusalem (Conflict in Cities). 
 
The mobility infrastructures that separate these homogenous enclaves simultaneously enhance 
Israeli mobility and restrain Palestinian movement. Major thoroughfares connecting Israeli 
settlements cut through the urban fabric of Palestinian neighbourhoods without serving them, 
dividing them into isolated enclaves and stifling local urban life and social exchange across the east 
of the city. Like the roads connecting Israeli settlements in the West Bank, these ‘conflict 
infrastructures’ (Pullan, 2013b) turn Palestinian space into an archipelago of disconnected islands 
(Handel, 2013). The spatial inequality brought about by the mobility gap is exacerbated by the lack 
of investment in Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem. Due to decades of neglect, even middle-class 
Palestinian neighbourhoods lack basic amenities, including functional roads and pavements, 
connection to the sewage system, reliable garbage removal, community facilities, public parks and 
postal service (Cheshin et al., 1999; UN OCHA, 2009). Such policies based on unequal citizenship, 
effective ethnic segregation and resource allocation on the basis of ethnicity have been termed 
'urban ethnocracy' (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2002).  
 
Over the last decade, the Israeli Separation Barrier, a more overt means of interrupting movement, 
has cut off at least 55,000 Jerusalem residents – a quarter of the city’s Palestinian population – from 
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the centre of the city and the economic, educational, medical and social resources located there. 
Residents of Palestinian areas of Jerusalem now located on the West Bank side of the Wall, 
exclaves such as Kufr Aqab and Shuafat Refugee Camp, are considered residents of the city but do 
not benefit from most municipal services (UN OCHA, 2011). For much of 2014, for instance, 
residents of Shuafat camp and the surrounding neighbourhoods did not have a reliable water supply 
(Shuafat camp local representative). The liminal status of these exclusionary exclaves has also 
created a security vacuum, as neither Israeli nor Palestinian police enter the exclaves (Dumper, 
2014), leading to a proliferation of crime and regular gun violence (Nidal and Amneh, Kufr Aqab). 
While it was built ostensibly as a security measure to ward off Palestinian suicide attacks in the 
centre of the city, the Barrier has increased insecurity for Palestinians, who also fear their 
permanent exclusion from the rest of the city as municipal officials have abrogated their 
responsibility for these areas (Hasson, 2010). 
 
From this top-down view, it appears that Jerusalem fits neatly into the enclave urbanism paradigm, 
where the establishment of ‘spaces of mobility and flow for some’ is predicated on the ‘construction 
of barriers for others’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 11). Urban inequality is entrenched by 
enclavisation, with the securitisation of some urban areas causing the insecurity of others, service 
provision severely lacking in marginalised neighbourhoods, and a variety of legal regimes and 
access restrictions being applied to the enclaves and exclaves. As segregated mobility 
infrastructures in East Jerusalem appear to only further sever Israeli and Palestinian areas from one 
another, in this situation of ‘frontier urbanism’ (Pullan, 2011), it has been argued, residents of 
enclaves have a merely ‘spectatorial relationship’, lacking the direct personal interaction that might 
alleviate the conflict (Hercbergs and Noy, 2015). 
 
 
Palestinian everyday mobilities and the transgression of borders 
 
 
The restriction of Palestinian mobility by means of barriers, checkpoints, roadblocks and a complex 
permit system is one of the Israeli occupation’s main methods of spatio-social control (Weizman, 
2007; Ophir et al., 2009). This mobility regime negatively impacts Palestinian everyday life by 
stifling movement (Hammami, 2004, 2010; Kelly, 2006; Handel, 2009; Harker, 2009), yet many 
Palestinians nonetheless insist on moving between their disconnected enclaves and into Israeli 
spaces. Beyond transgressing geographical borders, I argue, everyday mobility can also be 
transgressive in its assertion of presence in shared urban spaces.  
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‘Maintaining the connection’ in spite of the Separation Wall 
 
Palestinians who refuse to accept the restriction of their mobility regularly cross the checkpoints 
separating them from the urban core, despite the fact that these journeys entail heavy traffic, long 
periods of waiting, humiliating treatment by soldiers and a higher risk of encountering clashes 
between Palestinians and the Israeli army (Braverman, 2011; Kotef and Amir, 2011; Tawil-Souri, 
2011; Amir, 2013). Several respondents who crossed checkpoints regularly conceptualised their 
insistence on movement, in spite of hardships, as ‘maintaining the connection’ the Israeli 
occupation was attempting to sever (Reema, Bab al-Zahra). Thus, for them a daily commute 
constituted an act imbued with political significance, or even religious duty, as in the case of Aya 
from Kufr Aqab, who travelled to the old city of Jerusalem several times per week to pray at the 
Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount). Several commuters living on the West Bank side of the Wall 
repeatedly noted they had ‘the right’ to go anywhere in Jerusalem. Residents of the exclaves cut off 
by the Barrier insisted that their Jerusalem ID cards conferred the right to enter Jerusalem, despite 
the fact that checkpoints were occasionally closed to them. Bilal, a Ramallah resident without a 
permit to enter Jerusalem, refused to accept the Israeli mobility regime: ‘It is my capital, so I will go 
just to see my friends, to drink tea with them. There doesn’t need to be an emergency. I should be 
allowed to go anytime.’ While intended as a hard boundary, the Separation Wall is in fact quite a 
porous border. Not only is it open to Israeli settlers, who do not require permits to cross, but in 
addition to approximately 90,000 workers from the West Bank who are permitted to work in Israel 
(PCBS, 2015), some 14,000 Palestinian labourers also cross from the West Bank into Israel and 
Jerusalem without a permit every day (UN OCHA, 2013). 
 
Both those respondents who crossed ‘illegally’ and those with Israeli permission employed various 
tactics to minimise the strain of the journey and thus make the crossing less disruptive to their lives. 
In circumventing checkpoints, or knowing which routes to use at which time, they display an 
intimate knowledge of the surveillance and control regime (Zureik et al., 2010). In addition, many 
commuters made use of social media to obtain updates on the traffic and security situation at 
checkpoints surrounding Jerusalem. Evading militarised mobility regimes by circumventing 
constraints and making use of the available resources might then be considered part of the 
Palestinian ‘art of presence’ (Bayat, 2009). While most saw walking as the least preferable way of 
crossing urban borders, as it leaves the walker exposed, pedestrian movement also allows 
Palestinians to evade Israeli controls, for instance by using small alleyways and back routes on foot 
10 
(Ahmad, Beit Hanina), thus opening up possibilities of movement beyond the predetermined routes 
set by state power (Handel, 2009). 
Despite insisting on their irrevocable right to access the city, most respondents cut off from 
Jerusalem in fact only entered the city without a permit when it was urgently necessary – for a visa 
appointment at a consulate or to visit a friend or family member in hospital. According to Dina, a 
Bethlehem resident, ‘It’s not worth the risk just to go for fun.’ Others found the difficulty associated 
with crossing discouraged them from entering the city at all. Salma, a resident of the suburb of Abu 
Dis, who had at one point crossed the Barrier without a permit while in labour in order to give birth 
in Jerusalem, now said she found it ‘easier to pretend Jerusalem doesn’t exist.’ She had not visited 
in several years, even though she had the opportunity to obtain a permit to enter the city during 
Ramadan, because she found her disconnection from Jerusalem so painful. Amneh from Kufr Aqab, 
who had various health problems, had not gone to see her doctor on the Jerusalem side of the 
Barrier for several weeks because she anticipated the journey across the checkpoint would be too 
strenuous. 
 
Embodied practices  
 
Mobility related to leisure, rather than to quotidian journeys, can also serve to undermine 
boundaries and Israeli control in Jerusalem’s urban space. Activities such as walking, running, 
cycling or parkour resonate with notions of freedom of movement on both an affective and a 
political level. Dina, who goes on regular extended runs in areas surrounding Jerusalem, found this 
allowed her to experience the ‘Palestinian landscape’ in new ways. While running gave her the 
sense of being ‘like a bird set free’, she also made the conscious decision to run on roads usually 
reserved for settlers, and thus to overstep the enclave borders prescribed by the occupation. 
Similarly linking embodied experience with collective political visions of space, walks through the 
Palestinian landscape have been discussed as a means of personally connecting to the land and its 
history, but also of resisting the increasing fragmentation of Palestinian space (Shehadeh, 2008). 
However, those engaging in outdoor sports such as mountain biking near settlements noted their 
circumspection because encounters in seam zones could be dangerous (Bilal). Others found that 
engaging in such activities caused potentially dangerous confusion about their identity; one East 
Jerusalem commuter who cycled to work, for instance, was regularly mistaken for an Israeli or 
foreigner because this was seen as unusual behaviour for a Palestinian. Palestinian youth who 
practice parkour or BMX stunts in Jerusalem’s old city test the boundaries of accepted behaviour by 
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using space in unexpected manners. Their disruption of the routines of shared and highly securitised 
spaces, such as the stairs leading to Damascus Gate, makes light of a tense situation. Acting in a 
spatially expansive manner by acting rowdy or blocking the way of passers-by, they subtly provoke 
soldiers on patrol (Figure 2) and thereby exert a certain light-hearted dominance over the space. 
 
Figure 2: A parkour practitioner from Silwan performs a flip as he passes Israeli border police on 
Khan az-Zeit Street in the old city (film stills: Nina Renaux). 
 
Transgressions into settlement enclaves 
 
The inequitable distribution of resources, which becomes especially apparent at the seam zones 
where Israeli and Palestinian neighbourhoods interface, causes Palestinians to regularly transgress 
the borders of neighbouring settlements in order to make use of services not provided in their 
residential areas. Thus, next to parks (Hasson, 2013) and playgrounds (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014), 
Palestinians make use of the settlements’ shopping opportunities (Hanan, Beit Hanina), including 
malls carrying Israeli brands, stores selling alcohol and petrol stations with better prices (Ibrahim, 
Beit Hanina). Many Palestinian respondents, however, noted ambivalence about venturing into the 
enclaves of the other, including discomfort based on language barriers (Hamdi, Shuafat), fear of 
discrimination (Aya) or their own political disapproval of buying from Israeli establishments 
(Reema). Nonetheless, the establishment of the Jerusalem light rail in 2011 has increased such 
quotidian transgressions. The shopping mall in Pisgat Zeev, for instance, has become much more 
accessible to Palestinians, leading to the perception among locals of a significantly increased Arab 
presence in the settlement (David, Pisgat Zeev).  
 
Temporary movement into settlements in East Jerusalem to make use of local resources can also 
initiate more permanent changes to residential patterns. Israeli settlements were conceived as 
exclusively Jewish, and the majority of East Jerusalemites cannot purchase or lease land there (Ir 
Amim and BIMKOM, 2010), yet an estimated 4,500 Palestinians have moved into settlements. 
While most are middle class citizens of Israel (Yacobi, 2012b), East Jerusalemites are increasingly 
moving into settlements as well, mainly due to the better services (Maha, Beit Hanina), more 
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affordable prices (Ahmad), a ‘Western’ lifestyle and a lower degree of social control compared to 
Palestinian areas (Razan, Palestinian former resident of French Hill). French Hill appears to be 
especially popular, not only because it is among the oldest settlements, but also because it is 
familiar to Palestinians like Razan who attended the adjacent Hebrew University. As they visit on a 
regular basis during their studies, the ‘politics of presence’ (Bayat, 2009) entails a gradual 
expansion of positions which has the potential to permanently reshape the makeup of these 
exclusive enclaves. The quotidian use of Israeli space renders it familiar, thus making a permanent 
move into such enclaves more viable for Palestinians. This familiarity also produces a less polarised 
understanding of the enclave space and its residents. Thus, Maha found French Hill was ‘not really 
a settlement’ due to the strong presence of students and foreigners. A similar sentiment was echoed 
by other Palestinians who had experienced the residents of a particular settlement as ‘normal 
civilians’ not necessarily motivated by an exclusivist ideology. Such flexible conceptions of 
political boundaries show that the meanings of spaces in the city are constantly re-inscribed as 
exclusive spaces are used in new ways.  
 
Due to the worry that an increased Palestinian presence will eventually change the character of the 
enclave (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014), many landlords refuse to lease flats to Palestinians, yet those 
who are willing to pay a ‘premium for being Arab’ can usually gain access (Razan). Contrary to 
enclave urbanism in other Israeli cities, where global neoliberal processes appear to go hand in hand 
with urban segregation along ethnic lines (Monterescu, 2009), then, in some of Jerusalem’s 
enclaves the ‘free market’ contributes to the undermining of ethnically-based segregation. 
 
Upholding and reinforcing enclave borders 
 
Marginalised exclaves as zones of autonomy 
 
While Palestinians regularly enter secular Israeli areas for business or pleasure, Palestinian 
neighbourhoods are rarely visited by Jewish Israelis, in particular since the second Intifada (Garb 
and Savitch, 2005; Greenberg-Ranaan and Shuval, 2013). Palestinians capitalise on the lack of 
Israeli movement into their neighbourhoods – in particular in the exclaves outside the Barrier. The 
socio-spatial exclusion of these areas has numerous drawbacks, yet residents also utilise the fact 
that housing beyond the Wall is more affordable and not subject to the same level of stringent 
regulation that makes legal construction close to impossible in East Jerusalem. Because of this, the 
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exclaves have seen a veritable building boom in recent years, and thousands of new residents have 
moved in (Kufr Aqab village council; see also Dajani et al., 2013; Charney and Rosen, 2014). 
According to a member of the local committee of Shuafat refugee camp, many residents here refuse 
to pay the municipality or companies associated with it: ‘In Shuafat, everything is free. People do 
not pay for a building permit, we refuse to pay municipal taxes or bills for water or electricity.’ 
When residents of the camp refused to grant access to tax inspectors, this caused politicians to 
worry that Israeli sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem was being called into question (Selig, 2010; 
Pitrikovsky, 2014).  
 
Due to the lack of municipal enforcement, Jerusalemites living in the exclaves can cohabitate with 
partners who hold West Bank identification without risking forfeiting their Jerusalem residency for 
having left the municipality. Mariam, a West Bank ID holder who is married to a Jerusalemite 
stated: ‘Although it’s not very good area, I’m glad that there is a place like Kufr Aqab where I can 
live together with my husband. This is the only place for us.’ There are thought to be several 
thousand couples in a similar situation utilising this interstitial legal ‘grey space’ (Yiftachel, 2009) 
created by the exclusionary exclaves to their advantage in order to circumvent the mobility regime 
imposed by the Israeli occupation (legal counsel for Kufr Aqab residents). As they move to the 
margins of the city in order to be able to remain part of it, their socio-spatial exclusion, 
paradoxically, grants them a certain degree of autonomy and freedom from Israeli from interference 
of the Israeli mobility regime. 
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Figure 3: Students pass through the checkpoint into Shuafat refugee camp after attending school on 
the Jerusalem side of the Separation Barrier. The tall buildings behind the Wall indicate the lack of 
enforcement of building regulations in the exclave (Hanna Baumann). 
 
 
The Jerusalem light rail: disrupting the advancing frontier 
 
By linking Israeli and Palestinian enclaves that were previously served only by separate public 
transportation, the Jerusalem light rail has not only increased Palestinian movement into the 
connected settlements. On their way into the western part of the city, residents of the settlements of 
Pisgat Zeev and Neve Yacov inevitably pass through Palestinian Shuafat. Despite Palestinian calls 
to boycott the light rail on the basis of its annexation of Palestinian land (Barghouti, 2009), the JLR 
was seen as a success in its first years of operation. The security situation was stable, with only 
occasional scuffles between passengers, and Palestinians used the tram in higher than expected 
numbers (JLR security consultant). According to the CEO of the light rail operator at the time, 
integration worked ‘like heaven’ and there was ‘harmonised life between all groups’. From a 
Palestinian perspective, this accommodation was due to a sense of resignation: ‘The people were 
already paying for the train and couldn’t stop its construction, so they made use of it’ (Ahmad). Yet, 
Palestinian attitudes to the train remained ambivalent, with some residents supporting a full boycott 
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and others expressing concern with regard to personal safety (Noor, Shuafat), or unwillingness to 
pay for tickets: ‘I see the train as a settler project, so of course I don’t want to support it financially’ 
(Rania, Ramallah resident working in Jerusalem). Indeed, the number of riders who do not pay for 
their ticket is higher at the stops in Palestinian areas, according to JTMT statistics, suggesting that 
skipping the fare may be used as a form of silent protest against the Israeli municipality, a type of 
‘everyday resistance’ (Scott, 1985). 
 
Both critics and advocates of Israeli settlement expansion in East Jerusalem observed that the light 
rail helped to ‘strengthen Jewish presence’ in Palestinian Shuafat, which was previously off-limits 
to most Israelis, suggesting that temporary Israeli uses of the space might result in permanent 
settlements (Arieh King in Wishart, 2015). The tram stops and the associated infrastructure look 
like those in West Jerusalem: clean platforms are lined by newly-planted trees and lit by modern 
street lights, there are large advertisements in Hebrew and armed private security contractors are 
always present. By demarcating the space along the JLR route as Israeli, the light rail made Shuafat 
‘legible’ (Scott, 1998), creating a safe familiarity for Israelis, who had previously avoided the area. 
At first, the new Israeli movements into the neighbourhood were of a benign nature mirroring the 
pragmatic Palestinian uses of settlements and included using the main road as a short cut or a free-
of-charge parking space. Later transgressions became more violent, with settlers destroying 
property and threatening locals (Hamdi). When a Palestinian teenager was kidnapped from the 
Shuafat main road and murdered in July 2014, this caused several days of protests and 
confrontations, with residents’ anger directed in particular at the light rail. Although the 
transgressions had been carried out by individuals, the opening up of Shuafat to Jewish Israelis can 
be seen a ‘strategy’ in the sense of de Certeau, in that it originates from a place of power and is 
backed up by institutions, unlike the individualised Palestinian tactics of enclave transgression 
outlined above. This became particularly clear when, following protests, unmanned aerial vehicles 
were introduced to identify individuals attacking the tram in Shuafat, a symbolic militarisation of 
civilian infrastructure. As the means of opening up hitherto inaccessible spaces, the light rail itself 
had become the advancing frontier of Jewish settlement expanding into Palestinian Jerusalem, a 
fortified ‘space of “flow”’ (Weizman, 2006) in its own right. 
 
To residents, the train represented not only the municipality, and thus the Israeli occupation, but 
also the physical means by which Israeli settlers accessed the neighbourhood. Although the boy’s 
killers had not used the tram, it became the target of their anger following the murder (Noor). Over 
the course of several days of protests and clashes with Israeli security forces, protesters 
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systematically dismantled all infrastructure associated with the light rail at the Shuafat stations: 
security cameras, station shelters, signage, ticket machines, tracks, signals, traffic lights and 
underground wiring, as well as electricity pylons (Figure 4). The thoroughness of the destruction 
reflected their view that Israeli infrastructures, mobility infrastructure in particular, are deeply 
implicated in the structural violence of the Israeli occupation in that they serve to expand its reach 
into new areas – in this case, through settlers’ quotidian movements.  
 
By interrupting the train service, the destruction forced those living in settlements at the northern 
end of the JLR line to take alternative routes, circumventing Palestinian areas. Despite not having 
taken part in the protests, one Shuafat resident expressed his support for the destructive acts: ‘If 
[having to transfer to a bus] means even a small inconvenience to the settlers, if they will avoid 
Shuafat in the future, then the protests have achieved something.’ Even after the light rail began 
operating again, attacks with rocks and paint continued, damaging a large portion of the rolling 
stock (JTMT Engineer). More than mindless destruction, then, we might then think of the disruption 
of the light rail as a form of ‘tactical vandalism’ (Ward, 1973), an attempt to maintain the existing 
enclave borders by limiting Israeli transgressions. This shows that marginalised urban residents are 
not only victims of exclusion from ‘spaces of flow’ (Castells, 1996), but that they also have the 
capacity to disrupt the routines of those living in premium networked spaces, and thereby 
‘decompress’ their time-space (Sopranzetti, 2014). The Palestinian ability to stop unwanted Israeli 
movement through their enclaves resulted in the reclamation of a level of territorial control that also 
reverberated inside the nearby settlements, if only temporarily. In addition, in the manner in which 
they disrupted Israeli habitual movements, Palestinians had appropriated one of the key methods of 
Israeli control over Palestinian space – making unpredictable the time and risk involved in travel 
and thus disturbing the rhythms of everyday life. 
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Figure 4: Destruction and barricades at the as-Sahel light rail stop in Shuafat following clashes in 
July 2014 (Hanna Baumann). 
 
The image of the train initially promoted, as a symbol of the city growing together as a 
‘cosmopolitan metropolis’ (Nolte and Yacobi, 2015), was destroyed by the attacks, and suddenly 
the light rail became an emblem of Jerusalem’s ongoing conflict (cf. Miller, 2014). Expressing the 
origins of Palestinian ambivalence to the light rail, Ahmad, who had lived in Shuafat for much of 
his life, stated: ‘People tried to convince themselves that this train is a civilised thing. But this 
happy picture is just based on racism, it’s fake. We don’t want this kind of civilisation.’ After close 
to five decades of Israeli occupation and neglect, Palestinians are ‘tired’, as Hamdi put it, and want 
to live decent lives, therefore taking ‘what [they] can get’ in terms of services from the 
municipality. At the same time, the light rail is seen as a symbol of normalisation that glosses over 
the underlying situation of unequal citizenship and urban rights. Therefore, it was rejected in a 
highly symbolic manner, even if this meant that residents deprived themselves of one of the few 
services the municipality provides for them.  
 
Access restrictions and the self-limitation of movement 
 
While the state has access to formal means of enforcing borders, the JLR incident shows that the 
interruption of mobility from the bottom up can also serve to reinforce enclaves.  In times of 
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heightened violence or political tension, Israeli security services increase access control across 
Jerusalem by operating temporary checkpoints at the entrance to Jewish settlements or by cordoning 
off access roads to Palestinian areas with concrete blocks to restrict the movement of entire 
communities (Eisenbud, 2014; Hasson, 2015). In the sense of Foucault, such closures (familiar from 
the West Bank) are a way of ‘partitioning’ space in order to gain greater control and ‘break up 
collective dispositions’ (1979: 143). Yet, the regulation of access to enclaves is not only a top-down 
strategy, and boundaries are also reinforced by people’s self-limitation in terms of movement. In 
times of heightened inter-ethnic violence in Jerusalem, young men in Palestinian neighbourhoods 
easily accessible to Israelis such as Wadi al-Joz erected vigilante checkpoints. Some perceived areas 
behind the Barrier to be safer than areas of East Jerusalem more accessible to Israelis. Sameer, a 
father of two school-age children, explained: ‘In Beit Hanina we can’t let our children go outside to 
play – so we sent them to their grandmother in Kufr Aqab, there they can play outside, no settlers 
will enter there.’ In this way, the abjection of the marginalised exclaves outside the Wall, also 
creates a protective buffer from outside intrusions.  
As the threat of violence in shared areas increases, residents restrict their movements to the most 
necessary and retreat into ‘purified’ spaces; they avoid military installations such as checkpoints 
where there are unpredictable and ‘different rules, based on the political situation’ (Aya) and mixed 
areas, particularly crowded ones such as markets (Hanan). Some women noted they ‘avoided 
leaving the home at all’ and worried extensively about relatives who did. Due to the decrease in 
passengers during the July-August 2014 war in Gaza, the East Jerusalem bus consortium made 
significant losses. The JLR also saw a significant drop in daily passenger trips in July 2014 (JTMT, 
2014), in line with survey data according to which 60% of Palestinians who had previously used the 
JLR no longer did so following the events of that month (IPCC, 2014). The head of the Ramallah-
Jerusalem Bus Company explained the decrease in public transport usage saying simply: ‘When 
there is war, the people don’t move.’ This also proved true during other periods of tension, such as 
during the increase in stabbings and shootings in autumn 2015. Residents of seam zones, such as 
Musrara, located on the Green Line, noted the absence of any street activity as people remained in 
their houses out of fear. In particular in such times, Mahmoud said, ‘we feel these invisible 
boundaries’ when traversing the city. Others relayed feelings of relief when stepping back into their 
‘home’ enclave, the invisible line often symbolised by a familiar landmark, such as Damascus Gate, 
coming into sight (Ahmad, Reema). 
 
Geographies of fear in urban settings, often discussed in relation to crime and terrorism, are closely 
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linked to fear of Otherness (cf. Bannister and Fife, 2001). The personal fears respondents in 
Jerusalem expressed were marked by worries of being violently attacked on the grounds of their 
own identity or the visibility thereof. This guided their decisions on which spaces to frequent and 
when, how to get there and how to conduct themselves. Those who had no choice but to continue 
frequenting mixed spaces in times of tension because they worked in Israeli areas stated that they 
were afraid despite their familiarity with the areas. They attempted to minimise their difference and 
avoided disclosing their Arab identity by avoiding interactions with Israelis (Musa, Beit Hanina; 
Hamdi, Ahmad). Following several attacks on veiled women on the JLR, a number of Palestinian 
women temporarily adopted the typical dress of orthodox Jewish women to continue covering 
themselves while concealing their identity (Maha). On the one hand, this reflects how boundaries 
are inscribed on the body and move through the city with it, discernible in details such as clothing, 
hairstyle, body language or accent. On the other hand, the capacity to adopt the dress of the other 
convincingly also shows proximity and familiarity with other groups’ customs across ethnic 
divides. Such instances of hybridity reflect the double consciousness of the colonised, who have 
better insight into the world of the coloniser than vice versa, echoing the imbalance in Palestinians’ 
access to Israeli spaces. Such an instance of ‘colonial ambivalence’ (Bhabha, 1994), then, perhaps 
illustrates the limitations of enclave urbanism in a dense urban setting: while borders may be clearly 
delineated, movement within and exchange across them are never fully suppressed. At the street 
level, people interact – whether in a civil or hostile manner. 
 
Reconsidering enclave urbanism in light of everyday mobility 
 
Enclavisation and the restriction of Palestinian movement is a key spatial strategy of the Israeli 
occupation across the territories occupied in 1967 (Falah, 2005). These mechanisms of control are 
reflected at a more local scale in Jerusalem – yet they function differently in dense urban fabric, 
where daily movements cannot be controlled and curtailed in the same manner. As I have shown, 
not only states or economic elites have the capacity to mobilise and immobilise – subaltern 
mobilities and disruptions of movement can also undermine or reinforce urban enclaves. 
 
Examining everyday movements across enclaves has allowed contradictions and ambiguities to 
emerge that would have been lost when focusing solely on residential patterns. This approach has 
shown that Palestinians living in marginalised areas of East Jerusalem routinely transgress both 
explicit boundaries and less visible residential borders to make use of amenities in Jewish enclaves 
(albeit often with ambivalent attitudes), forging ‘activity spaces’ (Kwan, 2009) far beyond their 
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residential areas. Unwilling to accept the Israeli-imposed boundaries within and around the city, 
Palestinians in Jerusalem thus move across enclaves, undermining the meaning and efficacy of the 
border through everyday practice. While the Israeli mobility regime has severed many connections, 
Palestinians insist on their right to access all parts of Jerusalem, reflecting the sense that ‘resisting 
immobility’ has become a key form of spatial opposition to the Israeli occupation (Hammami, 
2004).  
 
Occasionally, their ‘quiet encroachment’ on settlements can alter the character of the enclave 
permanently. While enclave urbanism is often portrayed as a global phenomenon, attention to local 
histories often reveals that different typologies of enclaves are not a new development. Israeli 
settlement enclaves in East Jerusalem are not merely neoliberal gated communities of economic 
privilege, but are rooted in older ethnic segregations, in the division of the city between 1948 and 
1967, as well as the military purpose of frontier settlements (cf. Rosen and Razin, 2008). In fact, the 
recent market-driven turn seems to partially undermine ethnic boundaries by allowing some 
Palestinians to buy their way into what were once enclaves of ethnic exclusivity.  
 
Palestinians’ regular transgression of enclave borders and their utilisation of the relative advantages 
of exclusionary exclaves complicate the classical narrative of socio-spatial exclusion. The 
marginalised here simultaneously make use of the services in the areas of the dominant group and 
utilise the autonomy provided by their own enclaves, which can thus be seen as functioning like a 
‘sociospatial shield’ (Wacquant, 2010). As Palestinians are able to live with partners with a 
different residency status and because construction is not as prohibitively difficult as on the 
Jerusalem side of the Wall, these deregulated exclaves are not unlike the South African ‘grey areas’ 
under Apartheid rule, where racial mixing was quietly tolerated (Elder, 1990). In both, deregulation 
created a situation of insecurity, but also allowed autonomy and breathing space away from state 
control.  
 
In disrupting the Jerusalem Light Rail, residents of Shuafat appeared to counter-intuitively entrench 
their own marginalisation by depriving themselves of access to a public service – yet I have argued 
that this immobilisation of the train constituted a defence of Palestinian enclave borders. As in other 
(post)colonial cities which have always had splintered service provision (Kooy and Bakker, 2008; 
Zérah, 2008), the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ mourned by much of the literature on enclave 
urbanism was never present in Jerusalem. The highly symbolic acts of destruction by which 
Palestinians expressed their rejection of the light rail dismantle the notion that marginalised groups 
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necessarily seek, or benefit from, inclusion in premium services. In disrupting Israeli mobility, 
Palestinians adopted tactics familiar from the Israeli mobility regime. If continuous circulation 
(based on the metaphor of the healthy human body) epitomises the functioning city (Swyngedouw, 
2006), and since the light rail served as ‘the symbol of connecting different parts of Jerusalem’ 
(Tamir Nir, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem in charge of Transportation), we might read this 
interruption of flows through attacks on infrastructure as a refusal to be part of the Israeli 
municipality and the body politic it represents.  
 
As I have argued that the light rail can be understood as a frontier expanding exclusive enclaves at 
the expense of marginalised residents, we should consider that ‘infrastructural violence’ is not only 
at work when excluded groups lack access to public services. In a situation of territorial conflict like 
the one in Jerusalem, incorporation into infrastructural circuits can also constitute a form of 
violence.  In more ‘ordinary’ cities too, then, urban infrastructures should not only be seen as the 
markers or borders of exclusion in enclave urbanism, but potentially as a potential means of 
expanding premium enclaves. While Palestinians view the JLR as a vehicle of colonial expansion, 
elsewhere, improved access to mobility infrastructures can act as a harbinger of gentrification (Lin, 
2002; Kaufmann et al., 2007; Grube-Cavers and Patterson, 2013). It may therefore be worth 
examining the role of everyday mobility in processes of displacement involved in gentrification or 
the ‘upgrading’ of informal settlements. 
 
Because traversing the city is necessarily an embodied experience, I have attempted to highlight the 
importance of affect in the perception of intra-urban borders, in their transgression and in 
encounters with the other. In the ‘alarmist’ narrative of enclave urbanism such encounters are 
generally marked by conflict and fear, whereas I have shown a fluctuation between civil quotidian 
interactions (which can alter conceptions of enclaves previously considered hostile) and encounters 
marked by fear in periods of heightened inter-ethnic violence. The notion that more contact in 
shared spaces would necessarily foster urban cohesion, implied by much of the literature on urban 
enclaves, was not confirmed by the light rail in Jerusalem or the new spaces of interaction it opened 
up. While an uneasy civility prevailed on the train during its initial years of operation, quotidian 
contact between different groups on the newly shared mode of transport appears to have done little 
to overcome underlying differences (cf. Amin, 2002; Valentine, 2008). Like other new spaces of 
normalisation, such as the Israeli malls increasingly frequented by Palestinians, the light rail might 
initially have given the appearance of an ‘already binational city’ (Shtern, 2015). However, because 
this limited interaction took place in the context of ongoing occupation, ethnocratic rule and urban 
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inequality, the light rail did not become a site of positive encounter. Rather, it expanded the 
potential zone of friction, as evidenced by increasingly violent incidents along the route of the light 
rail, including stabbings and vehicular attacks (Heller, 2014). In that it limits expansive movement 
beyond one’s own enclave, we might think of such ethnically-based violence in shared spaces or 
towards outsiders as a (particularly insidious) type of ‘border enforcement’. Ultimately, this kind of 
re-enforcement of enclave borders in times of tension serves to maintain homogeneity within 
enclaves and minimise spaces of ambiguity, usually located in liminal areas – a ‘purification of 
space’ which, as we see here, is not only carried out by the dominant group. Critiques of enclave 
urbanism have focused on the segregation of mobility infrastructures as it allows (kinetic) elites to 
avoid encountering marginalised Others. Yet a bottom-up reading of quotidian mobilities in 
Jerusalem suggests that structural inequalities cannot be overcome merely by everyday interaction. 
While urban enclaves exacerbate social distance in spite of physical proximity, temporarily jointly 
inhabited spaces, such as the light rail, alone are unlikely forge solidarity across these divides. 
 
This examination of Jerusalem’s enclaves through the lens of Palestinian everyday mobility has, 
then, altered the narrative of the top-down approach focused on residential segregation. It has 
shown both how tactical mobility can undermine residential segregation by eroding homogeneity 
and how marginalised residents can stop incursions, thus reinforcing urban divisions in order to 
preserve their own ethno-national space. If we understand space as relational rather than static and 
accept that intra-urban boundaries, like all space, are socially produced and underpinned by 
people’s actions, we cannot ignore the role of mobility, or lack thereof, when attempting to make 
sense of the enclave city. 
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